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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the responsibility for a plaintiff's injuries between tortfeasors on the basis
of relative fault. Fairness could then be achieved between the parties
without the difficulties attendant on the "bare cubicles of easy nomen-
clature"' 3 6 of the active-passive negligence indemnity theory.
DAVID L. BAYLARD
THE UNAVAIABILITY REQUIREMENT FOR
EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
Hearsay is commonly defined as any out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matters asserted therein.' Although hearsay is gen-
erally inadmissible, there are several exceptions to the hearsay rule, some
of which require the unavailability of the witness or declarant as a condition
precedent to their use. There are generally considered to be four such ex-
ceptions: declarations against interest, prior reported testimony, dying
declarations, and declarations as to pedigree. These exceptions are based
on the necessity2 for resorting to hearsay statements-i.e., they represent
the best or the only source of evidence, and any disadvantages 3 which might
accrue to the adversary are outweighed by the indispensability of the evi-
dence to a proper determination of the issues.
Missouri has adopted the view, premised on necessity, that "whenever
the testimony of a witness is unavailable as a practical proposition, his
declaration should be received."4 This is the general standard now applied
in determining whether a witness is unavailable for purposes of the hearsay
exceptions which require unavailability. The purpose of this comment is
to examine the application and scope of the unavailability requirement
for these exceptions to the hearsay rule.6
Although there are differences in the conditions of unavailability re-
quired to satisfy the four exceptions, similar conditions are applicable to
136. This description was first used in Falk v. Crystal Hall, Inc., 200 Misc.
979, 984, 105 N.Y.S.2d 66, 71 (1951), afrd, 279 App. Div. 1071, 113 N.Y.S.2d 277
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
1. C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (2d ed. 1972).
2. See Sutter v. Easterly, 854 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945); 5 J. WIGAoWo,
EvIDEc §§ 1420-21 at 251-53 (3d ed. 1940).
3. The primary objection to hearsay evidence is that it may be unreliable
because the declarant is neither under oath nor subject to cross-examination at the
present trial. Bartlett v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S.W.2d 740
(1942).
4. Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 295, 189 S.W.2d 284, 289 (1945); accord,
Orr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 494 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Mo. En Banc 1973);
Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 237 S.W.2d 210, 212 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951).
5. The use of depositions, the Federal Rules of Evidence pertaining to ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule, and the unavailability requirement in regard to
criminal proceedings will also be examined in this comment.
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HEARSAY UNAVAILABILITY
declarations against interest and prior reported testimony. These conditions,
which normally include the declarant's death, absence, insanity, illness or
disability, refusal to testify, or loss of memory, will be discussed more
fully in following sections. As a general rule, declarations concerning pedi-
gree are not admissable unless the declarant is dead.6 Missouri courts have
relaxed this requirement by stating that the declarant must be "dead or
otherwise unavailable,"7 although they have not as yet had to deal with a
declarant whose testimony was unavailable for a reason other than his
death-e.g., insanity, illness, etc. Missouri courts would probably hold that
such conditions render the declarant's testimony unavailable for purposes
of this exception. Almost all jurisdictions,8 including Missouri,9 require
the declarant to have died as a prerequisite to the admission of a dying
declaration.
In order to establish a right to introduce the above types of hearsay
evidence, the unavailability of the declarant or the unavailability of his
testimony at the present trial must be shown.10 It should be noted that we
are not dealing only with the physical unavailability of a declarant because
he may be present and yet unavailable. For instance a witness may be
deemed unavailable when he refuses to testify based on a fifth amendment
claim. This comment, however, will not emphasize this distinction but will
speak generally to the unavailability of a declarant. The determination
whether there has been a sufficient showing of the unavailability of the
declarant rests largely within the discretion of the trial court.1 1
II. CONDITIONS WHICH CONsrrruTE UNAVAILIBILITY
A. Death
Unavailability based on the declarant's death is universally accepted.
Originally, death was the only condition which would satisfy the unavail-
ability requirement for exceptions to the hearsay rule.12 Today, however,
the only exception for which death is required in Missouri is a dying
declaration.
There are several types of evidence which have been held sufficient to
establish the death of the dedarant.13 For instance, a death certificate is
6. Vantine v. Butler, 240 Mo. 521, 144 S.W. 807 (1912). The Federal Rules
of Evidence are contrary. See pt. IV of this comment.
7. Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 238 Mo. App. 46, 50, 176 S.W.2d
506, 507 (K.C. Mo. App. 1943); State v. Bowman, 278 Mo. 492, 213 S.W. 64 (1919).
The court in State v. McDonald, 55 Or. 419, 106 P. 444 (1910), held that the re-
quirement was satisfied if the dedarant was absent because he was out of the
state.
8. For a contrary view, see text accompanying note 116 infra.
9. State v. Hendricks, 172 Mo. 654, 73 S.W. 194 (1903). See note 116 and
accompanying text infra.
10. State v. Purl, 183 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1944).
11. Orr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 494 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. En Banc
1973); Dryden v. Aitken, 405 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. 1966).
12. State v. McO'Blenis, 24 Mo. 402 (1857) (former testimony); Wynn v. Cory,
48 Mo. 346 (1871) (declaration against interest).
13. State v. Jackson, 495 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
1976]
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prima fade evidence of death.' 4 In addition, although the declarant's death
may not ordinarily be shown by one who can speak to that fact only
from hearsay,' 5 it has been held that common reputation in the deceased's
family is sufficient to establish his death.' 0 There is also a statutory pre-
sumption of death after an absence from the state for a period of seven
years.17
B. Absence
in one of the first cases to question the propriety of the early de-
cisions making death the only condition sufficient to establish unavail-
ability, the Missouri Supreme Court' s held that a witness' mere absence
from the jurisdiction of the court did not warrant the admission of his
deposition, but stated that the outcome would be different if such absence
was procured by the adverse party.19 This decision was overruled by State
v. HarpO which held that when a witness is out of the state and beyond
the reach of process, his presence at trial is as unattainable as if he were
dead. This situation, where the declarant is beyond the jurisdiction of the
court, is now generally accepted as rendering him "unavailable," at least
in civil cases.21 Under this condition of unavailability, declarations against
interest,22 prior reported testimony,2 3 and possibly declarations as to pedi-
gree24 are admissible.
When hearsay evidence2 5 is offered on the theory that the witness is
beyond the court's jurisdiction or absent from the trial because he cannot
be located, the proponent must show that the declarant is either out of the
jurisdiction or cannot be found despite the exercise of due diligence to
secure his presence at trial.20 The degree of effort which constitutes due
14. § 193.170, RSMo 1969.
15. State v. Gallina, 352 Mo. 557, 178 S.W.2d 433 (1944); Biggs v. Modern
Woodmen of America, 71 S.W.2d 783 (K.C. Mo. App. 1934), rev'd on other
grounds, 336 Mo. 879, 82 S.W.2d 898 (1935).
16. Denbo v. Boyd, 194 Mo. App. 121, 185 S.W. 236 (Spr. Ct. App. 1916).
17. § 490.620, RSMo 1969.
18. State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 440 (1858).
19. Where the absence of a declarant is due to procurement by a party,
the declarant will be deemed unavailable and his statements admitted. State v.
Brown, 285 S.W. 995 (Mo. 1926); State v. Butler, 247 Mo. 685, 153 S.W. 1042
(1913).
20. 320 Mo. 1, 6 S.W.2d 562 (En Banc 1928).
21. In regard to criminal cases, see pt. VI of this comment.
22. State v. Brown, 404 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. 1966); Straughan v. Asher, 372
S.W.2d 489 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963); Neely v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 241
Mo. App. 1244, 252 S.W.2d 88 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo.
282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945).
23. Dryden v. Aitken, 405 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. 1966); State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d
842 (Mo. 1960); State v. Purl, 183 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1944); Bartlett v. Kansas City
Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S.W.2d 740 (1942); Welp v. Bogy, 218 Mo. App.
414, 277 S.W. 600 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925).
24. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
25. This is also required for the admission of a deposition in some situations.
See text accompanying note 93 infra.
26. Welp v. Bogy, 218 Mo. App. 414, 277 S.W. 600 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925).
[Vol. 41
3
Lee: Lee: Unavailability Requirement for Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
HEARSAY UNAVAILABILITY
diligence will depend upon the facts of each case.2 7 Usually it is sufficient
to show that a witness could not be located after a reasonable .effort to find
him, or, although located, he refused to attend and testify.23
Courts disagree as to whether temporary absence is sufficient to satisfy
the unavailability requirement. The majority view29 appears to require
permanent or indefinite absence. Nevertheless,. some courts3 0 hold that the
temporary absence of the witness is sufficient to justify admitting his out-of-
court statements. This would seem to be the better rule when the witness'
testimony is not important enough to merit a continuance until his return
or where the opponent of the evidence does not consent to'a continuance.
In a criminal case,31 the Missouri Supreme Court said that in order
for prior reported testimony to be admissible due to the witness' absence,
such *absence must be permanent or indefinite.3 2 If faced with this ques-
tion in a. civil case, Missouri courts may consider temporary absence suf-
ficient to satisfy the unavailability requirement because the -requirement
is that the witness be unavailable as a practical matter. In reaching this de-
termination, however, other factors, such as the importance of the witness'
present testimony and the desirability of a continuance, should be con-
sidered.
C. Insanity
When a witness has become incompetent to testify by reason of ii
sanity, his present testimony at trial "is to all intents and purposes as un-
attainable as if he were dead."33 Thus, where a witness has become insane
or mentally incapacitated, his prior reported testimony has been held ad-
missible.3 4 The same is true in regard to declarations against interest.3 5
Where a party offers hearsay evidence predicated on the witness' in-
sanity, questions arise as to the degree of insanity necessaiy to render him in-
competent to testify. In State v. Herring3 6 the court held that legal confine-
ment in an insane asylum or an adjudication as an insane person creates
a presumption of incompetency as a witness. However, this presumption
27. Kagan v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 860 S.W.2d 261 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
28. State v. Lloyd, 337 Mo. 990, 996, 87 S.W.2d 418, 422. (1935); see State v.
Scott, 117 Kan. 303, 235 P. 380 (1924). This showing may not be sufficient in
criminal cases today. See pt. VI of- this comment. It should, however, be sufficient
in civil cases.'
29. State v. Purl, 183 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1944). See also Williams v. Calloway,
281 Ala. 249, 201 So. 2d 506 (1967); Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v.
Lobo, 391 P.2d 819 (Okla. 1964); C. McCoRmi~rcK, supra note 1, § .253, at 609.
30. Coakley v. Crow, 457 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 906 (1971); Martin v. Duncan Auto. Co., 53 Nev. 212, 296 P. 24 (1931).
31. See pt. VI of this comment.
32. State v. Purl, 183 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1944). The, court cited 16 C.J.
Criminal Law § 1557 (1918) as stating the prerequisites to the admission of former
testimony in a criminal case.
33. State v. Pierson, 337 Mo. 475, 485, 85 S.W.2d 48, 5a (1935).
34. Id; Welp v. Bogy, 218 Mo. App. 414, 277 S.W. 600 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925).
35. See Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945); Neely v. Kan-
sas City Pub. Serv. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1244, 252 S.W.2d 88 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952).
36. 268 Mo. 514, 188 S.W. 169 (1916).
1976]
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may be rebutted by a voir dire examination of the witness, or by extrinsic
evidence.37 In light of Herring, the court in State v. Pierson3 s stated that
the witness should be produced and examined before the court if this
could be done without creating an unreasonable risk of harm to him. The
reason for the examination of the witness is that an insane person is not
incompetent as a witness if he has sufficient mental capacity to understand
the nature of an oath, and if he possess sufficient mind and memory to
observe, recollect, and narrate the things he will testify to.30 If the declarant
lacks any of these qualities he is incompetent as a witness. Thus, his testi-
mony is unavailable and his earlier statement should be admissible.
D. Illness or Disability
It appears to be settled that the illness or physical disability of a wit-
ness renders him unavailable for the purpose of admitting his out-of-court
statements. Both prior reported testimony40 and declarations against inter-
et 4 1 are admissible when the witness is unavailable due to illness or dis-
ability.
There is disagreement, however, concerning the extent and duration
of the illness or disability necessary to satisfy the unavailability require-
ment.42 The illness or disability should at least be sufficiently severe to
prevent a witness from attending trial.43 Some jurisdictions require that the
witness' illness or disability be of a long-term or permanent nature. On the
other hand, a few cases have held the temporary illness or disability of
the witness sufficient to render him unavailable.4-1 Missouri courts have
not addressed this issue, but 'a witness who is only temporarily ill or dis-
abled might be considered unavailable from a practical standpoint, and
therefore, temporary illness may be sufficient to constitute unavailability
under the standard applied in Missouri.45 The best approach would be to
determine in each case whether the importance of the witness' present testi-
mony merits a continuance until the witness will be available; if not, the
witness' out-of-court statement should be admitted.
37. Bell v. Gaerther, 355 Mo. 617, 197 S.W.2d 611 (1946).
38. 337 Mo. 475, 85 S.W.2d 48 (1935).
39. State v. Herring, 268 Mo. 514, 531, 188 S.W. 169, 174 (1916).
40. Heinbach v. Heinbach, 262 Mo. 69, 170 S.W. 1143 (1914); Kirton v. Bull,
168 Mo. 622, 68 S.W. 927 (1902) (physically unable to attend court); Scoville v.
Hannibal and St. Jdseph R.R. Co., 94 Mo. 84, 6 S.W. 654 (1888) (loss of speech
due to paralysis). See Welp v. Bogy, 218 Mo. App. 414, 277 S.W. 600 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1925).
41. Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945); Straughan v.
Asher, 372 S.W.2d 489 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963).
42. "The scarcity of cases dealing with this question indicates that most of
these situations are handled by continuance." C. McCoamIc, supra note 1, § 253,
at 610.
43. Heinbach v.. Heinbach, 262 Mo. 69, 170 S.W. 1143 (1914).
44. See Harris v. Reeves, 421" S.W. 689 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); People v.
Droste, 160 Mich. 66, 125 N.W. 87 (1910).
45. See text accompanying note 4 supra. A greater degree of permanency
may be required in criminal prosecutions. See pt. VI of this comment.
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E. The Exercise of a Privilege or Refusal to Testify
It is generally accepted that the exercise of a privilege by a witness
satisfies the requirement of unavailability. 46 The privilege usually in-
voked is the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Sutter v.
Easterly47 was the first Missouri case to consider this ground of unavail-
ability. The Missouri Supreme Court held that declarations against interest
are admissible where the dedarant is called as a witness but claims his
privilege against self-incrimination.48 Adopting the necessity principle,4 9
the court stated that whenever, as a practical proposition, a witness is un-
available-as is the case when he asserts his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion-is out-of-court declaration should be received. In fact, these circum-
stances make it even safer to admit a declaration against interest than if
the witness were dead, because his refusal to testify is added assurance that
he believes the declaration to be true. If it were not, the witness would
probably take the stand to repudiate it.50 Likewise, it is generally held that
testimony given by a witness at a previous trial or preliminary hearing is
admissible where the witness later refuses to testify because his testimony
may incriminate him. 5' It should be noted, however, that the Missouri
civil procedure rule governing the admissibility of depositions52 does not
include the deponent's exercise of a privilege as a ground for admission. 53
Several courts5 4 have held that testimony by the spouse of a criminal
defendant given at a preliminary hearing or former trial is admissible
where the defendant at a subsequent criminal trial claims the privilege5
of refusing to allow his spouse to testify against him. The same result
would probably obtain in Missouri, but the courts have not yet been con-
fronted with this situation.56
46. Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945); People v. Brown,
26 N.Y.2d 88, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825, 257 N.E.2d 16 (1970); People v. Pickett, 339
Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681 (1954). This is a situation where the witness is present
but his testimony is unavailable.
47. 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945).
48. Id. at 289. See also State v. Brown, 404 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. 1966); Neely
v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1244, 252 S.W.2d 88 .(K.C. Ct. App.
1952); Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 237 S.W.2d 210 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951).
49. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
50. 354 Mo. at 295, 189 S.W.2d at 289.
51. State v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Mo. 1974). See also People v.
Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681 (1954); Exleton v. State, 30 Okla. Grim.
224, 235 P. 627 (Crim. App. 1925).
52. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 57.07 (1975).
53. See pt. III of this comment.
54. McCoy v. State, 221 Ala. 466, 129 So. 21 (1930); Wyatt v. State, 35 Ala.
App. 147, 46 So. 2d 837 (1950); State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 P. 489 (1911).
55. See § 546.260, RSMo 1969.
56. One cannot be required to testify against a defendant spouse if the de-
fendant objects. § 546.260, RSMo 1969. Although declarations against interest
would present little difficulty for a court, there may be a question with regard to
former testimony. Former testimony may be used in the manner provided for the
use of depositions and with like effect, and a witness is presumed to testify when
his deposition is read in evidence. § 492A10, RSMo 1969; Howard v. Strode, 242
6
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Missouri courts have not considered the question of unavailability in
regard to other privileges which would appear to render a witness unavail-
able if exercised-i.e., the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient
privilege, the priest-penitent privilege,57 and the confidential communica-
tions privilege between spouses.58 Courts which have held a witness unavail-
able because he invoked the fifth amendment or is precluded from testi-
fying under the .husband/wife -witness privilege afforded a criminal de-
fendant should .also :consider a witness, unavailable if he does no.t testify
due to the invocatioa of.any of these other privileges. This is a logical ex-
tension of the rationale .involved.
Although a court may consider the witness unavailable, it may feel con-
strained not to allow the admission of the witness' prior testimony or
declarations against interest when one of these latter privileges is invoked.
The primary purpose of these privileges is different from that of the fifth
amendment or witness privilege. When a witness exercises his fifth amend-
ment privilege, he is protecting himself. On the other hand, an attorney,
for instance,: who refuses to testify concerning confidential information
obtained from.a client is protecting the client and not himself. Admission
of the witness' out-of-court statements disregards the purpose of these
privileges, and unless the privilege has been waived, the need for the evi-
dence may be outweighed by the need to retain the confidentiality sought
to be protected.
A flat refusal to testify has been held to render the witness as unavail-
able as one who is -out of the jurisdiction of the court.59 Faced with this
situation, the Missouri courts. would probably consider the witness unavail-
able because the witness is as "practically unavailable" as one who refuses
to testify on the ground that his testimony might tend to incriminate him.
A New Jersey -court- has gone so far as to hold that the declarant of a
declaration against interest was, for all practical purposes, :unavailable
where he would have been a hostile witness and the proponent of' the evi-
dence could not afford to be bound by his in-court testimony.00
F. Supervening Disqualification: The Dead Man's Statute61
Unavailability of a witness' testimony may also result from the' applica-
Mo. 210, 146 S.W. 792 "(1912). Thus, 'the argument would be that using the former
testimony is equivalent to requiring the spouse to testify. However, because the
Missouri Supreme Court held in State v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. 1974),
that former testimony of a witness was admissible when he invoked the fifth
amendment, this argument would most likely be rejected by the court.'
57. § 491.060, RSMo (1969).
58. § 491.020, RSMo (1969).
59. Johnson v. People, 152 Colo. 586, 384 P.2d 454 (1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 922 (1964); Naylor v. Gronkowski, 9 Ill. App. 3d 302, 292 N.E.2d 227 (1972).
The result would be -the same under Federal Rule 804 (a) (2). Contra, Pleau v.
State, 255 Wis. 362, 38 NW.2d 496 (1949).
60. Statev Sejuelas, 94 N.J. Super. 576, 229 A.2d 659 (1967).
61. Supervening disqualification may also result from the insanity of a wit-
ness. See pt. 11 (c) of this cbmment. "
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tion of the Missouri Dead Man's Statute.62 Under the Dead Man's Statute,
the death or insanity of one of the parties6 3 to a lawsuit bars the testimony
of the surviving party, thus rendering his testimony unavailable. Due to the
concept of waiver 4 and the fact that only parties are disqualified from
testifying, there appears to be only one situation in which the disqualifica-
tion could lead to the admission of the disqualified party's out-of-court
statements as exceptions to the hearsay rule. This is where testimony of
the disqualified party given during an earlier trial when there was ,no dis-
qualification is offered by the disqualified party at a subsequent trial of the
same cause.0 5
As with the attorney-client privilege and similar privileges, there is a
question concerning the propriety of admitting the prior testimony of the
disqualified party. Because the Dead Man's Statute is a bar to present in-
court testimony given under oath and subject to cross-examination, prior
testimony should probably also be barred. The purpose of the Dead Man's
Statute is to prevent any unfairness which would result from the advantage
one party would have if permitted to testify without fear of contradiction. 68
The former testimony has the same effect as the present testimony of the
disqualified party but is less reliable. It should probably be barred, at
least where the prior testimony of the decedent is not available, because
to admit one without the other allows the advantage the statute is intended
to prevent.
G. Loss of Memory
Only a few courts have decided whether a claimed loss of memory
renders a witness unavailable for the purpose of admitting his out-of-court
statements as exceptions to the hearsay rule. In Orr v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company67 a witness made several statements to a
State Farm representative which were against the witness' interest but bene-
ficial to the company. When his deposition was later taken by State
Farm, the witness claimed he had forgotten making the statements as well
as the subject matter of those statements. The witness was a resident of
Kansas and therefore not present at the trial. His declarations against in-
62. § 490.010, RSMo (1969).
63. Under the Missouri Dead Man's Statute the term "party" may not neces-
sarily refer to an actual party to the law suit, but for purposes of this comment
it does.
64. See Bishop, Waiver of the Missouri Dead Man's Statute, 39 Mo. L. REv.
218 (1974).
65. This situation could arise in one of two ways. First, testimony is received
at a prior trial when both parties are alive so there is no disqualification. Sub-
sequent to this trial but prior to a later trial one of the parties dies, resulting in
the disqualification at the later trial of the surviving party who at that time wishes
to introduce his prior testimony. Another way in which this situation could occur
is to have a non-party witness testify at the first trial. Prior to the second trial
the witness becomes or is made a party to the suit. He is then disqualified from
testifying at the second trial in the event the opposing party is dead.
66. Freeman v. Berberich, 332 Mo. 831, 60 S.W.2d 393 (1933).
67. 494 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
1976]
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terest were admitted over objections that the witness should be considered
an available witness68 because State Farm had taken his deposition. The
Missouri Supreme Court held that the witness was not available merely
because he had been deposed.69 This, plus the fact that the witness was
absent from the trial, would appear to have been sufficient for the court
to reach its decision to admit the declarations. Nevertheless, the court con-
tinued by way of dicta to say that even if these factors had not been pres-
ent, the declarant's testimony would have been unavailable due to his
claimed loss of memory at the time his deposition was taken.7 0
The court reiterated the statement made in Sutter v. Easterly that, for
purposes of the unavailability requirement, it is sufficient that the de-
clarant or his testimony be unavailable as a practical proposition.71 The
court said that a witness will be deemed unavailable if he testifies to a com-
plete loss of memory concerning his prior statements, because a witness
who claims a total loss of memory is no more available than a witness who
refuses to testify by exercising his privilege against self-incrimination. 2
The practical effect of such a claim by a witness is to put his testimony
beyond reach, thus creating the necessity for using his prior statements.
Few courts have gone so far in extending the grounds for unavailability
to include a loss of memory.7 3 Of course, where the witness' loss of memory
is due to illness, senility,74 or lapse of time,7 5 his prior statements will
usually be more reliable than his present testimony and therefore ad-
missible. However, some courts have held that faulty memory due to mere
lapse of time is an insufficient reason to admit prior reported testimony.
In Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co,76 a witness had testified for
the respondent at the first trial but failed to testify at the second because
he was outside the jurisdiction. In a deposition taken by the appellant
several years after the first trial but prior to the second, the witness
claimed he could not remember many of the details about which he had
previously testified. After the deposition was put in evidence, the witness'
former testimony was offered and admitted to fill in the gaps in the deposi-
tion which resulted from his faulty memory. The Missouri Supreme Court
held the admission of the prior reported testimony to be error because the
68. The court considered abandoning the unavailability requirement for
declarations against interest but found it unnecessary to do so in this case. See
Shklar, The Unavailability Requirement for Declarations Against Interest-Should
it be Retained?, 39 Mo. L. Rlv. 461 (1974).
69. See pt. V of this comment.
70. 494 S.W.2d at 299.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. McDonnell v. United States, 472 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1973); FED. R. EVw.
804 (a)(3); Naylor v. Gronkowski, 9 Ill. App. 3d 302, 292 N.E.2d 227 (1972).
Contra, Rio Grande S.R. Co. v. Campbell, 55 Colo. 493, 136 P. 68 (1913).
74. Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108 (1879).
75. Anderson v. Gaither, 120 Fla. 263, 162 So. 877 (1935); Naylor v. Gron-
kowski, 9 Il. App. 3d 302, 292 N.E.2d 227 (1972).
76. 346 Mo. 28, 142 S.W.2d 455 (1940).
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mere loss of memory by a witness who was not mentally incompetent was
insufficient to render the witness unavailable. 7'
Orr and Turner involved similar circumstances, but the hearsay evi-
dence in Orr was held admissible due to the witness' unexplained loss of
memory. These cases may be factually distinguished in two ways. In Orr,
the deponent claimed a total loss of memory as to his prior statements,
whereas the deponent in Turner had only partially forgotten the details to
which he had previously testified. Therefore, the argument can be made
that only a complete loss of memory will be sufficient to render a witness
unavailable for purposes of admitting his prior statements. To find un-
availability in a situation involving only partial forgetfulness would con-
tinually present the question of the degree of forgetfulness required.
A second distinction is that Turner dealt with former testimony
whereas Orr dealt with declarations against interest. This distinction, how-
ever, is of little significance when considered in light of the courts' decisions
dealing with these two exceptions to the hearsay rule. Whenever a witness
has been considered unavailable for the purpose of one of these exceptions,
the same ground of unavailability has been held to satisfy the unavailability
requirement with regard to the other exception. This should hold true
when the witness is unavailable due to his loss of memory. In any event,
Orr is the most recent case and should therefore be controlling, thus mak-
ing a loss of memory on the part of a witness a sufficient ground to render
the witness unavailable, at least as to declarations against interest and prior
reported testimony.
The Orr court did not discuss in detail the policy considerations in-
volved in finding unavailability based on an alleged loss of memory. Un-
fortunately, the loss of memory may or may not be bona fide. Situations in
which the witness in good faith testifies that he cannot remember some-
thing should be treated the same regardless of whether the loss of memory
is caused by illness, old age, or mere lapse of time. Under these circum-
stances his prior out-of-court statements should be admissible due to the
unavailability of his present testimony and the fact that his earlier testi-
mony is probably more reliable than his present testimony would be.
It is more difficult to justify a finding of unavailability based on loss
of memory when the alleged loss of memory may not be bona fide. A feigned
loss of memory may satisfy the unavailability requirement under the follow-
ing analysis. If a witness simply refuses to testify despite judicial pressure
to do so, his testimony will probably be considered unavailable.78 In a
situation where a witness claims a loss of memory when he actually does
remember, the witness is, in effect, simply refusing to testify to those
facts he claims to have forgotten. By analogy, the witness whose claimed
77. Id. at 463. The court stated that this rule applied whether the witness
testified by deposition or was present in person.
78. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
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loss of memory is not bona fide should be considered as unavailable as the
witness who refuses to testify7 9
Loss of memory is rejected as a ground of unavailability by some
courts because it may encourage a witness to "forget" the subject matter of
his prior statements where it suits his purposes.8 0 There is a potential for
abuse of the rule making a witness unavailable if he alleges a loss of memory.
For example, a witness who desires to aid a party without having to testify
may feign forgetfulness in the hope that his prior statement favorable to
that party will be admitted. On the other hand, there are situations where
refusing to admit the witness' prior statements may achieve the result the
witness desires.8 ' While a closer inquiry into the validity of the witness'
loss of memory and the motivation behind it might seem appropriate in
such a case, the speculative nature of such an inquiry and the limited cir-
cumstances under which it is likely to be needed make it impractical. A more
workable approach is the one apparently adopted in Orr making a witness
unavailable any time he claims a loss of memory.
Even though the court in Orr dealt with this ground of unavailability
by way of dicta, Missouri courts should follow its conclusion that a wit-
ness' alleged loss of memory renders him unavailable and, therefore, his
prior statements admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The court's
analysis and conclusion seem correct because his testimony is, as a practical
matter, unavailable.
III. REQumEMENTs FOR THE ADMISSION OF DEPOSTIONS
Even if a deposition is not considered to be hearsay,8 2 its similarity
to prior reported testimony is obvious. Most jurisdictions, including Mis-
souri, condition the use of the deposition as substantive evidence8 3 upon
unavailability requirements specified by statutes or rules of court.8 4
The use of depositions in Missouri civil cases is governed by Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 57,85 which lists several situations which satisfy the
requirement that the witness be unavailable. First, where the witness dies
79. Naylor v. Gronkowski, 9 Ill. App. 3d 302, 292 N.E.2d 227 (1972).
80. Rio Grande S.R. Co. v. Campbell, 55 Colo. 493, 136 P. 68 (1913).
81. Orr is an example of this type of situation. Had the court fouind the
witness available and refused to admit his prior statements, State Farm may have
been found liable which is what the witness apparently desired.
82. See State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. En Banc 1973); Pulitzer
v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 400 (En Banc 1935); Woelfle v. Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 112 S.W.2d 865 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938).
83. A deposition may be used for impeachment or as the admission of a
party opponent even though the witness is available. Pettus v. Casey, 358 S.W.2d
41. (Mo. 1962); Wilt v. Moody, 254 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1953).
84. Depositions were unknown at common law so the grounds or conditions
of their admissibility are usually prescribed by statutes or rules of court. 5 J. WIG-
MoRE, EvmmEcF, § 1401 (3d ed. 1940).
85. Mo. Sup- CT. R. 57.07 (1975). This rule replaced rule 57.29 but almost
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after being deposed, his deposition may be used in evidence.8 6 Second, a
deposition is admissible if the witness cannot safely attend court due to
age, sickness, bodily infirmity, or imprisonment.8 - The imprisonment of a
witness was not previously a ground in Missouri upon which to base the
admission of depositions. However, the Missouri Supreme Court Rules are
modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which include imprison-
ment as a ground for the admission of depositions. This condition is also
sufficient for the admission of depositions in other jurisdictions.88 Third,
where the witness is a judge, attorney, or physician,- his deposition is ad-
missible provided there is a showing that he is engaged in his official or
professional duties at the time of trial.8 9 Fourth, the deposition of a witness
who is a nonresident of either Missouri90 or the county in which .the
trial is held9 ' is admissible. Fifth, a deposition given by a witness is ad-
missible if he has gone out of the state or is over 40 miles from the place
of trial without the consent, connivance, or collusion of the proponent. 92
Finally, where the witness is absent without the consent, connivance, or
collusion of the proponent, his deposition is admissible provided the pro-
ponent has exercised due diligence in an unsuccessful attempt to,;obtain
his attendance by subpoena.98
These same grounds will generally be found in the statutes of other
jurisdictions. One ground that is expressly recognized in many jurisdictions,
but not in Missouri, is the supervening insanity of the witness. One theory
to explain why insanity is not an express ground in Missouri is that if
a witness is incompetent to testify at the time of trial, as he would be if
he were insane,9 4 his deposition is not admissible even if taken when the
deponent was competent.95 This is evidently because the deponent is pre-
sumed to testify when his deposition is admitted in evidence;96 , and,
therefore, "the competency of a deposition is to be determined by the status
86. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 57.07 (a) (3) (A) (1975); Welp v. Bogy, 218 Mo. App. 414,
277 S.W. 600 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925).
87. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 57.07 (a) (3) (B) (1975); Boyle v. Crimm, 363. Mo. 731,
253 S.W.2d 149 (1952); Kirton v. Bull, 168 Mo. 622, 68 S.W. 927 (1902); Scoville
v. Hannibal and St. Joseph R.R. Co., 94 Mo. 84, 6 S.W. 654 (1888).
88. See, e.g., Fr R. Civ. P. 32 (a) (3) (C); Ky. R. Civ. P. 32.01 (3) (10).
89. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 57.07 (a) (3) (C) (1975); Doyle v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
124 Mo. App. 504, 101 S.W. 598 (St. L. Ct. App. 1907).
90. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 57.07 (a) (3) (D) (1975); Bartlett v. Kansas City Pub.
Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S.W.2d 740 (1942).
91. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 57.07 (a) (3) (E) (1975); Meyers v. Karchmer, 313 S.W.2d
697 (Mo. 1958).
92. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 57.07 (a) (3) (F) (1975); State v. Brown, '285 S.W. 995(Mo. 1926) (procurement by adverse party); Carpenter v. Lippitt, 77 Mo. 242
(1883).
93. Mo. Sup. CT. K. 57.07 (a) (3) (G) (1975); Welp v. Bogy, 218 Mo. App. 414,
277 S.W. 600 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925); No definite rule can be laid down bs to
what constitutes due diligence. Kagan v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 360 S.W.2d
261 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); See In re Falzone, 240 Mo. App. 877, 220 S.W.2d
765 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949).
94. See pt. 11 (c) of this comment.
95. Howard v. Strode, 242 Mo. 210, 146 S.W. 792 (1912).
96. 242 Mo. at 227, 146 S.W. at 798-99.
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of the witness at the time the deposition is offered in evidence." 07 If the
witness were incompetent at that time, his deposition would be as inad-
missible as his present testimony. This theory, however, is antiquated and
should not be accepted, especially in view of the modern concept of the
hearsay rule and its exceptions. If the testimony was compentent when
given, it should be no less competent simply because the witness has be-
come insane.
Two arguments may be made in favor of admitting the deposition of
an insane witness as long as the witness was sane when deposed. First, in-
sanity is considered by many to be an illness. Its classification as an illness
may, at least technically, bring it within the second ground listed above.
Second, a deposition is a form of prior reported testimony, and the in-
sanity of a witness has been held to satisfy the unavailability requirement for
that exception to the hearsay rule. To illustrate, suppose that a witness
testified at the first trial but became insane prior to the second trial. His
prior testimony would be admissible in the later trial. On the other hand,
if a sane witness is deposed prior to a trial, but is insane at the time of
trial, his deposition would not be admissible under a literal reading of
rule 57. This result cannot be reasonably justified. Deposition should prob-
ably be considered prior reported testimony, and should be admissible
under any condition which satisfies the unavailability requirement for that
exception to the hearsay rule.
As noted earlier, Missouri cases dealing with unavailability due to
absence or illness have not considered whether temporary unavailability
is sufficient to satisfy the requirement. The same is true in regard to
depositions. Neither Missouri case law nor the Supreme Court Rules dis-
tinguish between temporary and permanent absence or illness. The previ-
ous discussions relating to this question seem to be applicable to the con-
ditions under which depositions may be admitted.98
The admissibility of testimony given at a prior trial is affected by
statute as well as by case law. Section 492.410, RSMo 1969, provides that
such testimony may be used at a subsequent trial "in the same manner and
with like effect as if such testimony had been preserved in a deposition."99
This has been interpreted to mean that a witness' former testimony may be
admitted into evidence in a later trial if the proponent of the testimony
shows one or more of the statutory conditions upon which depositions may
be read into evidence.' 00 For instance, if a witness is simply absent from
the trial, rule 57.07 requires the exercise of due diligence before his deposi-
tion may be admitted. This same requirement has been applied to the ad-
97. Maplewood Planing Mill and Stair Co. v. Pennant Constr. Co., 344
S.W.2d 629, 633 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
98. See pt. 11 (B) and II (D) of this comment.
99. § 492.410, RSMo (1969). See also Kagan v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 360S.W.2d 261 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
100. Welp v. Bogy, 218 Mo. App. 414, 277 S.W. 600 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925);
Sculley v. Rolwing, 88 S.W.2d 394 (St. L. Ct App 1935).
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mission of prior testimony.101 Any of the grounds listed in rule 57.07
should, by analogy, satisfy the unavailability requirement in regard to
prior testimony.' 02
On the other hand, it has been noted that testimony given at a prior
trial is admissible when the witness is unavailable for reasons other than
those listed in rule 57.07. For example, in State v. Phillips'o" the Missouri
Supreme Court admitted the former testimony of a witness who refused
to testify because his testimony might have incriminated him. Although
his former testimony was admitted, his deposition would not have been
admitted under rule 57.07, because the exercise of a privilege is not one of
the grounds listed in the rule. Therefore, when seeking the admission of
prior testimony, it is necessary to examine both the rule and the case law
to determine if the witness is unavailable.
IV. FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE' 0 4
Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with the recognized
hearsay exceptions which require the declarant to be unavailable as a wit-
ness. Unavailability, as defined by rule 804 (a),105 includes situations in
which the declarant: (1) is exempted from testifying on the ground of
privilege;' 06 (2) refused to testify; (3) testifies to a lack of memory;lOr
(4) is unable to testify as a result of death or physical or mental illness;'08
or (5) is not present at the hearing and the proponent of his statement
has not been able to procure his attendance, 09 and in some cases his testi-
mony,1 0 by process or other means. However, a witness is not unavailable
,,101. Kagan v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 360 S.W.2d 261 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
102. There is even authority to the effect that in order for former testimony
to be admissible, one of the grounds in Missouri Rule 57.07 must be shown.
Collins v. Leahy, 344 Mo. 250, 125 S.W.2d 874 (1939). This court was strictly
interpreting § 492.410, RSMo (1969).
103. 511 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. 1974).
104. Effective July 1, 1975.
105. FED. R. EvIm. 804 (a) (1-5) (1975).
106. M.S. Walker, Inc., v. Travelers Indem. Co., 470 F.2d 951 (lst Cir. 1973)
(declarations against interest); Mason v. United States, 408 F.2d 903 (10th Cir.
1969); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1973) (prior reported testimony).
107. United States v. Collins, 478 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1010 (1973) (prior reported testimony); McDonnell v. United States, 472 F.2d
1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 942 (1973). A court may choose to disbe-
lieve the witness' testimony as to his lack of memory. United States v. Insana, 423
F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970). If so, his feigned loss of
memory is subject to impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. United States
v. Allsup, 485 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1973). Whether the court can refuse to consider
the witness unavailable for purposes of exceptions to the hearsay rule in this
situation is not settled.
108. United States v. Bell, 500 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1974); Peterson v. United
States, 344 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1965).
109. United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1974); M.S. Walker,
Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 470 F.2d 951 (1st Cir. 1973).
110. Contra, Gichner v. Antonio Troiano Tile and Marble Co., 410 F.2d 238
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if any of the above situations are due to the procurement or wrongdoing
of the.proponent of the out-of-court statements.
Two aspects of rule 804 deserve comment. Rule 804 (a) (5) states that
absence is a ground for unavailability, but something more than mere ab-
sence is required. Further, this requirement is not the same for all the
exceptions. For purposes of the prior reported testimony exception, it
need only be shown that the proponent of the evidence is unable to pro-
cure the attendance of the absent witness. However, for purposes of
declarations against interest, dying declarations, and declarations as to
pedigree, it must be shown that the proponent was also unable to secure
the witness' testimony, such as by deposition or interrogatory,"' For these
exceptions, the rule requires an attempt, not only to secure the witness'
presence, but also to depose him.' In other words, the rule purports to
render a witness "available," even though he is absent, if he has been or
could reasonably have been deposed.
Several jurisdictions require an effort to take the witness' deposition
before he will be considered unavailable. 113 There is even authority for
this in two early Missouri cases, one of which held that if a deposition
could have been taken through the exercise of proper diligence, the prior
testimony of a witness would not be admissible.114 In Orr, 5 however, the
court held that the mere taking of a deposition did not render a witness
available. The court stated that it made no difference whether a deposi-
tion was taken or could have been taken. This language, added to the
fact that the court would not overrule prior cases holding that a witness
outside the jurisdiction of the court was unavailable, gives the impression
that the court would not require an effort to depose a witness as a condi-
tion precedent to a witness being deemed unavailable.
There are several disadvantages to a requirement that an attempt be
made to depose an absent witness. The procedure is both time-consuming
and expensive. There is also the possibility that a deposition, once taken,
would be useless for the purpose for which it was taken. For example,
where the deponent claims a loss of memory, or refuses to testify at the
taking of the deposition, the deposition is of no value. In any event, de-
position procedures are available to any party who desires to use them.
Giving due consideration to the benefit that may be derived from taking
a witness' deposition, such a requirement would appear to be an un-
necessary, impractical, and highly restrictive complication in situations in-
volving exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The second important aspect of the Federal Rules is that rule 804
departs. significantly from the common law by recognizing other grounds
111. 4 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM. Nmvs 7105 (1974).
112. 4 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM. NEws 7088 (1974).
113. -See, e.g., Burton v. Oldfield, 195 Va. 544, 79 S.E.2d 660 (1954); Pine
Bluff Co. v. Bobbitt, 174 Ark. 41, 294 S.W. 1002 (1927).
. 114. Franklin v. Gumersell, 11 Mo. App. 306 (St. L. Ct. App. 1881); Augusta
Wine Co. v. Weippert, 14 Mo. App. 483 (St. L. Ct. App. 1883).
115. 494 S.W.2d at 299.
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in addition to death as a prerequisite to the admission of dying declara-
tions.126 There is justification for this expansion of the common law. As-
suming that the circumstances of impending death provide reliability,117
the fact that a witness does not die but subsequently becomes otherwise
unavailable should not affect the trustworthiness of his declaration. The
death of the witness does not add to the truthfulness of the statement ex-
cept to the extent that it may help to insure that the declarant was in fact
in apprehension of near and certain death when the statement was made.
The necessity for admitting the declaration is just as great where the wit-
ness is unavailable for reasons other than death.
V. EFEar OF THE USE OF A PRIOR DEPOSITION
In .Orr the plaintiffs contended that the witness' out-of-court state-
ments, offered as declarations against interest, were inadmissible because
the taking of his deposition had made him "available."' 8' s Thus the issue
was whether a witness is available "because his deposition had been taken
prior to trial."119 The court held that the taking of a witness' deposition
does not make him available for purposes of the declaration against inter-
est exception to the hearsay rule.:20 The court's analysis is difficult to
follow, but it seems that the decision was based mainly on practical con-
siderations. According to the court, a contrary holding would have had
the effect of overruling prior cases which held that a witness outside the
jurisdiction of the court was unavailable, because a witness' deposition
could always be taken if his whereabouts were known. The court said there
was "no logical difference in the situation where a deposition has been
taken and the one where it could have been taken."' 2 1
The court made a distinction between the taking of a deposition and
its actual use at trial when it stated that although State Farm "was under
116. Under the common law, dying declarations were admissible only in pro-
secutions for criminal homicide, the declaration being that of the victim. See
5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1432-33, at 221-25. The federal rules, on the other
hand, permit the admission of dying declarations in civil cases and prosecutions
for crime other than homicide. Missouri still follows the common law, but does
allow the use of dying declarations in prosecutions for abortion where the
woman's death resulted. § 546.310, RSMo 1969. It would appear, therefore, that
Missouri still requires that the declarant be dead at the time his declaration is
offered even though the declarant need not die for a considerable time after the
declaration is made. State v. Hendricks, 172 Mo. 654, 73 S.W. 194 (1903). The
better view is that taken by the federal rules.
117. State v. Custer, 336 Mo. 514, 80 S.W.2d 176 (1935). The deceased must
have believed that he was going to die soon at the time the declaration was made.
State v. Woodard, 499 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
118, 494 S.W.2d at 298.
119. Id.,
120, Under similar cirmumstances, a federal court stated that it would not
preclude the introduction of a declaration against interest on the ground that the
witness was available simply because he had been deposed. Gichner v. Antonio
Troiano Tile and Marble Co., 410 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1969). This court would
reach a contrary result under FED. R. EvID. 804 (A) (5) which is now in effect. See
pt. IV of this comment.
121. 494 S.W.2d at 299.
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no obligation to use Charles' deposition.., if it had offered same it would
have made Charles its witness." 122 Dissenting in Orr, Judge Bardgett made
a similar distinction when he concluded that the "introduction in evi-
dence" 12 3 of the deposition rendered the witness available. The distinc-
tion between taking and using a deposition is important because once a
deposition is read in evidence it stands for and takes the place of a wit-
ness' 2 4 as to matters on which the witness attempted to testify in the
deposition, 1 5 and the deponent is considered the witness of the party in-
troducing the deposition.12 6 In Orr the out-of-court statements were of-
fered by State Farm prior to the plaintiffs offer of the deposition, so the
court was not faced with the situation where the deposition was already
in evidence. If State Farm had introduced the deposition and then sought
to have the declarations against interest admitted, a different result might
have been reached because depositions are used "as though the witness is
present and testifying."' 2 7 The court might have considered the witness to
be available under these circumstances, 28 at least as to State Farm. But
suppose that the plaintiff had introduced the deposition first, thereby mak-
ing the deponent his witness. Would this have precluded State Farm from
introducing the declarations against interest? Although it seems unreason-
able to allow one party or the other to introduce evidence first and thereby
control whether a witness is unavailable for purposes of admitting his out-
of-court statements into evidence, this may be the result under these cir-
cumstances. It is obvious that this aspect of the use of depositions raises
many questions; the answers to which are beyond the scope of this comment.
In any event, the issue before the court was whether the mere taking
of a deposition made the witness available. The court held it did not. In
view of the fact that most witnesses with relevant testimony will be de-
posed, a holding that a deposed witness is available would probably mini-
mize the use of the hearsay exceptions requiring unavailability, especially
declarations against interest and prior reported testimony. Under this ap-
proach, if a deposition was taken covering a particular subject matter, the
litigants would be required to look solely to the deposition for admissible
evidence on that matter. It was noted earlier that these exceptions to the
hearsay rule are recognized because of the necessity for this type of evidence.
A holding on this issue contrary to that of Orr would preclude the admis-
sion of this evidence in many cases where there is no other way to obtain it.
122. Id. See also Pettus v. Casey, 358 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1962).
123. 494 S.W.2d at S01.
124. Woelfie v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 112 S.W.2d
865 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938).
125. Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 346 Mo. 28, 142 S.W.2d 455(1940). The court in this case permitted the use of a transcript of former testi-
mony on matters not covered by a deposition which had been admitted.
126. Pettus v. Casey, 358 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1962).
127. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 57.07 (1975).
128. Even if the court had held the witness to be available because his deposi-
tion had been offered, it ultimately would have held the witness to be unavailable
due to the witness' loss of memory during the taking of the deposition.
[Vol. 41
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
In a criminal proceeding the confrontation clause'2 ' places a greater
burden on the state to show that a witness is actually and not just tech-
nically unavailable before his out-of-court statements may be used against
the defendant. Prior to Barber v. Page,3 0 it was generally accepted that the
mere absence of a witness from the jurisdiction of the court was a sufficient
ground to allow the admission of his former testimony because of the in-
ability of the prosecution to compel the attendance of the witness.'3 1 In
Barber, the defendant and one Woods were jointly charged with armed
robbery. During the preliminary hearing Woods waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and gave testimony that incriminated Barber.
Woods was not cross-examined by Barber's counsel. At the time of Bar-
ber's trial in Oklahoma, Woods was in a federal prison in Texas. The
government made no effort to obtain Woods' presence at the trial but was
allowed to introduce the transcript of Woods' testimony at the preliminary
hearing on the ground that Woods was out of the state and thus unavail-
able to testify. The Supreme Court invoked the confrontation clause of
the sixth amendment (made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment' 32 ) and held that for the purpose of allowing prior reported
testimony into evidence, a witness is not unavailable "unless the prosecu-
torial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at
trial."'1 3 Thus, in a criminal proceeding, unavailability can no longer be
established merely by showing that the witness is out of the jurisdiction.
The good-faith effort requirement appears to be based upon the
fact that numerous methods to secure a witness' presence are available
today.' 34 The Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings 3 5 is one such method.
Also, the attendance of a witness in the custody of federal officials may be
obtained by a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum136 In addition, vol-
untary cooperation by the declarant or law enforcement authorities in
other jurisdictions will often make the witness available even though he
may not be subject to process.
In State v. Brookins'3 7 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the ad-
mission of an absent witness' deposition was error because the state had
made no effort to secure the attendance of the witness by having her re-
turned to Missouri under the Uniform Law. The court, stating that the
129. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
130. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
131. J. WiGMORE, supra note 2, § 1404, at 149.
132. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
133. 390 U.S. at 724-25.
134. Id. at 723-24.
135. §§ 491.400-.450, RSMo 1969. This act provides a means by which prose-
cuting authorities in one state can obtain an order from a court in the state where
the witness is found directing the witness to appear in court in the requesting
state.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (5) (1964).
137. 478 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. 1972).
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accused was deprived of his sixth and fourteenth amendment right of con-
frontation, held that a deposition, if otherwise admissible, may be used only
when the defendant's constitutional rights will not be violated. The State
must show either that the witness is dead or that the party offering the
deposition made a good-faith effort to obtain the presence of the witness
at trial.38  The Supreme Court of Missouri has adopted similar language
in Missouri Supreme Court Rule 25.44 which specifies when depositions
offered by the state are admissible.
Although a greater burden may be placed on the state to show unavail-
ability, the circumstances which satisfy the unavailability requirement in
civil cases are generally applicable to criminal proceedings. The exercise
of the fifth amendment privilege by a witness satisfies the unavailability
requirement in criminal as well as civil cases. The Missouri Supreme Court
held that testimony given by a witness during a preliminary hearing is ad-
missible when the witness later asserts his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and refuses to testify, provided the defendant was present and had the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the prior hearing. 30
Illiness or absence may also render a witness unavailable, but it is
generally accepted that in criminal proceedings the temporary illness or
disability of a witness will not be sufficient to justify the admission of his
prior reported testimony. In Peterson v. United States 40 a witness was un-
available due to a temporary illness. The court held that the witness was
not unavailable for the purpose of admitting her testimony from a previous
trial. The same is true with regard to a witness' absence from the trial. In
Missouri, such absence must be either permanent or indefinite in criminal
cases.141 No matter which ground of unavailability is relied on, a higher
standard is required to establish the unavailability of a witness whose
out-of-court statements are offered against a defendant in a criminal pro-
ceeding. In substance the state must show actual unavailability.
VII. CONCLUSION
Unavailability is an important concept because it may be a prerequisite
to the admission of evidence crucial to a lawsuit. What constitutes un-
availability not only varies among jurisdictions, but also varies within a
single jurisdiction depending on the evidence sought to be admitted. Case
law determines when a witness is unavailable for the purpose of admitting
his prior out-of-court statements as exceptions to the hearsay rule, whereas
138. ,Id. at 375.
139. State v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. 1974). In this case there was no
transcript of the preliminary hearing but the court allowed testimony as to the
statements made by the witness.
140. 344 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1965). See also Smith v. United States, 106 F.2d
726 (4th Cir. 1939); 29 Am. JUR., Evidence § 754 (1967). The court in United
States v. Bell stated that it disagreed with Peterson if Peterson meant to imply
that in every case where a witness is ill but will sometime recover, the prosecution
must suffer a continuance or forego entirely the use of the evidence. 500 F.2d
1287 (2d Cir. 1974).
141. State v. Purl, 183 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1944).
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the conditions which satisfy the unavailability requirement for depositions
are set forth in the Missouri Supreme Court Rules. Many of these condi-
tions satisfy both requirements, but there are differences. A stronger show-
ing of uinavailability is often required in criminal cases.
Missouri has taken a more realistic approach than many. jurisdictions
regarding unavailability under the exceptions to the hearsay rule. A theory
of unavailability premised on necessity has been adopted. The unavail-
ability requirement is satisfied when a dedarant is unavailable as a prac-
tical matter. With this standard to guide them, Missouri courts are afforded
sufficient flexibility to find unavailability in any situation where there is a
legitimate need for the evidence.
ROBERT B. LEE
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